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CRIMINAL LAW – CAPITAL PENALTY HEARING 
Summary 
Appeal from a death sentence and conviction by jury of four counts of first degree 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon, among other crimes, after a death sentence entered by a 
three judge panel was appealed and vacated. 
Disposition/Outcome 
Affirmed.  The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court Holdings in Crawford v. Washington2 do not 
apply to the selection phase of a bifurcated capital penalty hearing.  This and other issues raised 
on appeal do not warrant reversal of his conviction and sentence. 
Factual and Procedural History 
The facts underlying Johnson’s conviction are explained in more detail in the court’s 
2002 opinion.   
In August of 1998, Johnson entered a home intending to commit robbery.  While inside, 
Johnson murdered 20-year-olds Tracey Gorringe and Matthew Mowen, 19-year-old Jeffery 
Biddle, and 17-year-old Peter Talamantez.  He left the home with several items of insignificant 
value.  Johnson was later arrested and charged with four counts of first degree murder.  In 2000, 
a jury convicted him on all counts, but could not agree during his penalty hearing on what 
sentence to impose.  Another penalty hearing was later held before a three-judge panel, which 
sentenced Johnson to death for each of the murders. 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Johnson’s conviction in 2002, but the fact that he 
was sentenced by a three-judge panel violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring v. Arizona.3  
His death sentence was vacated and remanded for a new penalty hearing.  The hearing was 
bifurcated into two separate phases: death –eligibility and selection. 
Death eligibility phase 
The State introduced evidence of a singe aggravating circumstance it pursued for each 
murder- that Johnson had been convicted of more than one murder. 
 
Johnson called several family members to testify on his behalf.  They stated that his 
mother and father abused alcohol and illegal drugs, including crack cocaine and PCP, sometimes 
in Johnson’s presence.  Johnson was beaten and watched his mother being abused by his father. 
                                                 
1 By Jason Ray 
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
 At one time, his sisters, and several of his cousins were forced to live in a shed for about 
a month in horrible conditions.  When the authorities found out, he was taken into custody by the 
State and later giver to his grandmother.  Johnson grew up in Compton where, as Johnson 
explained, there was a lot of violence and he was often chased and beaten. 
The jury returned four special verdicts finding the single aggravating circumstance and 
seven mitigating circumstances.  The jury found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and that Johnson was eligible for death. 
Selection phase 
Evidence regarding Johnson’s prior bad acts was admitted during this phase of the 
hearing.  The State introduced several instances of criminal activity, both in and out of prison, 
from the time Johnson was 15 to the time he was arrested for the quadruple murder. 
In addition to the prior bad act violence, the State also admitted impact testimony from 
the families of Johnson’s four victims.  The mother or father of all four victims testified that their 
respective child was intelligent, caring, and had a promising future. 
The Defense again called on members of Johnson’s family, each expressing the positive 
aspects of Johnson’s life.  The Defense also presented evidence regarding involvement in street 
gangs to stop the harassment of his family.  A professor of Sociology from the University of 
California at Berkley testified about gangs.  Several specialists with whom Johnson had worked 
also gave favorable testimony about him.  An accomplice in an incident in prison claimed all 
responsibility for the incident. 
The Jury returned four separate verdicts imposing a death sentence for each of the 
murders. 
Discussion 
The Confrontation Clause and the ruling in Crawford do not apply to the selection phase of a 
bifurcated capital penalty hearing 
Johnson’s first argument is that the district court violated his right to confrontation by 
admitting copies of his inmate disciplinary reports from the Clark County Detention Center 
during the selection phase of his hearing.  These reports contained hearsay statements by 
witnesses who were not shown to be unavailable and whom he had no opportunity to cross-
examine. 
However, as the court explained in Summers v. State, the right to confrontation does not 
apply to evidence admitted in a capital penalty hearing.  Therefore, Johnson did not have the 
right to confrontation. 
 
Admittance of Johnson’s juvenile records into evidence not an abuse of court discretion 
The Supreme Court decision of Roper v. Simmons4 did not prohibit the admission of 
juvenile records during a death penalty hearing, but instead held that executing offenders for 
crimes they committed as a minor was cruel and unusual punishment.  As there was no question 
that Johnson was an adult when he committed the crime, the court’s discretion to allow this 
evidence was not an abuse of discretion.  Johnson’s juvenile record was relevant to his tendency 
to violence and gang activity, but also his amenability to rehabilitation.  Despite the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence, it was only admitted during the selection phase, thus there are no concerns 
that it may have influenced the jury’s weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 
The district court was proper in allowing the State to ask questions during “voir dire” to discover 
the ability of the jurors to carry out the law. 
The district court is given considerable discretion to determine whether a line of 
questioning is improper.  As the defense made an objection and were overruled, the district court 
had the discretion to overrule the defense. 
Prosecutor misconduct 
While some remarks of the prosecutor were improper, the prejudice resulting from them 
was minimal and did not deprive Johnson of a fair hearing.  The remarks by a prosecutor are 
considered a harmless error where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, thus resulting in no 
prejudice to the defendant.5
Johnson raises several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.   
1. Alleged misconduct during the death-eligibility Phase: 
First, the prosecutor argued that if the jurors found in favor of Johnson, it would be 
disrespectful to the members of Los Angeles where Johnson grew up.  While this reference to 
public opinion was inappropriate, its impact was minimal given the correct jury instruction given 
that “a verdict may never be influenced by prejudice or public opinion.”  The allegation that the 
prosecutor violated a pretrial order by referring to the victims as kids was dismissed for similar 
reasons.  Another statement made in error by the prosecutor was immaterial. 
2. Alleged misconduct during the selection Phase: 
Johnson claimed that the prosecutor made remarks during his opening statement that 
referred to inadmissible evidence and were highly prejudicial.  While a prosecutor has a duty to 
refrain from making statements in opening arguments that cannot be proved at trial,6 Johnson did 
not contend that the remarks were made in bad faith.7  These remarks were serious because they 
                                                 
4 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
5 See Pelegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 628-29 (1998). 
6 Rice v. State, 113 Nev. 1300, 1312 (1997). 
7 Id. at 1312-13. 
implied that Johnson would continue the violence even while in prison.  However these two 
isolated comments were undermined by a five day selection phase and a jury instruction that 
opening statements are “not evidence and should not be given evidentiary value.” 
Johnson’s penalty hearing was not unfair because a victim’s brother passed out in the courtroom 
The victim’s brother had a right to be there, as it was a public hearing  
Mandatory Review
The court reviewed the death sentence independently8 and found that the evidence 
supported the finding, the death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice any arbitrary factor, and was not excessive.  The murders Johnson committed were 
unprovoked, vicious, and utterly senseless.  The death sentence was not excessive. 
Concurring Opinions 
Justice Rose, with whom Justices Maupin and Douglas agreed, filed an opinion 
concurring.  While J. Rose agreed that Johnson was not entitled to relief, J. Rose believes that 
Capital defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to confront the declarants of testimonial 
hearsay statements when admitted throughout an unbifurcated hearing and during the eligibility 
phase of a bifurcated hearing. 
Conclusion
Neither the Confrontation Clause, nor Crawford extend to evidence admitted during the 
selection phase of a capital penalty hearing.  Johnson’s hearing was fair. The death sentence is 
Affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2)(c)-(e) (2005).   
